利益背反作为打破串谋的一般策略研究——兼对诺奖得主梯若尔“防范串谋原理”的批评
Reverse Benefit as a General Strategy to Break Cooperative Game——With a Critical Evaluation of Jean Tirole's Principle of Preventing Collusion
作者：邓曦泽;
Author：
收稿日期： 年卷（期）页码：2020,231(06):-161-173
期刊名称：四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
Journal Name：Journal of Sichuan University (Social Science Edition）
关键字：利益背反;串谋;合作博弈;收益;风险;腐败暴露概率
Key words：
基金项目：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“冲突与协调——以春秋战争与会盟为中心”(13FZZ006);;
四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目(skqx201101)
中文摘要
串谋是经济、政治及其他社会生活中的常见现象,而利益背反是打破串谋的一般策略。运用此策略,以行贿受贿为例,可将之分为受贿阶段和完成阶段。在受贿阶段,只要受贿者主动举报,则他不但无过,反而有功,而对行贿者则予以惩罚;在完成阶段,奖惩关系相反。若此,双方的利益构成背反,并成为利益敌人,从而提高腐败暴露概率。此策略具有诸多特点:不需要考虑信息对称性、中立性、操作性强、成本低、适用范围广。与同时惩罚策略、囚徒困境策略、防范串谋原理和财产公示制度相比较,利益背反策略具有明显优势。此外,利益背反策略可以被推广,成为打破一切合作博弈的一般策略。
参考文献
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② J.Tirole,“Hierarchies and Bureaucracies:On the Role of Collusion in Organizations,” Journal of Law,Economics,& Organization,Vol.2,No.2,Autumn,1986,pp.181-214.
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(15)小概率串谋是指对因朋友关系和利益勾结关系而形成长期信用,进而建立的小概率串谋。这种情况不能绝对排除。但即便存在这种情况,利益背反策略也要比同时惩罚策略更有效。
(16)虽然囚徒困境的适用范围大且中立,即在第2、6项与利益背反策略相当,但利益背反策略在其他特征上优于它,所以,利益背反策略优于囚徒困境。
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