私募股权投资下的应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理——基于PIPE投资的经验研究
The Effect of Private Equity Investment on Accruals-based and Real Earnings Management——An Empirical Research Based on PIPE Investment
作者：徐子尧;张雪兰;赵绍阳;
Author：
收稿日期： 年卷（期）页码：2016,206(05):-120-133
期刊名称：四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
Journal Name：Journal of Sichuan University (Social Science Edition）
关键字：私募股权投资;应计盈余管理;真实盈余管理;声誉;联合投资;背景
Key words：
基金项目：国家自然科学基金“私募股权并购投资对我国上市公司治理机制的影响研究”(71350009);;
四川省软科学项目“四川省科技金融结合的创新机制研究”(2013ZR0009);;
中央高校学科前沿与交叉创新研究项目“基于私募股权投资基金的公司治理机制:理论模型与经验研究”(skqy201329)
中文摘要
私募股权投资已成为活跃在国际资本市场上的新兴力量,因其高度参与所投资企业的经营管理而带来的公司治理优化效应日益受到广泛重视。但是,对我国上市公司的相关研究发现:由于契约短期性等限制,私募股权的参与并未发挥公司治理优化效应,反而加剧了正向盈余管理;私募股权参与的上市公司盈余管理的方式更隐蔽,应计盈余管理及真实盈余管理兼而有之,且真实盈余管理的程度要高于应计盈余管理的程度;声誉、是否联合投资等私募股权特征显著影响上市公司盈余管理。据此,要发挥私募股权投资在优化公司治理、净化资本市场的积极作用,相关制度设计须兼顾有效约束私募基金因投资契约而做出的短视行为。
参考文献
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