20世纪中期英国双轨核政策的困境——以取消“蓝光”导弹项目为中心的考察
The Dilemma of Britain's Dual-track Nuclear Policy in the Middle 20th Century——A Case Study of Britain's Cancelling the “Blue Streak” Missile Program
作者：王娟娟;
Author：
收稿日期： 年卷（期）页码：2015,196(01):-75-82
期刊名称：四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
Journal Name：Journal of Sichuan University (Social Science Edition）
关键字：英国;“蓝光”导弹;双轨核政策;美英核关系
Key words：
基金项目：四川大学中央高校基本科研业务费研究专项项目“不对称的核‘依存’:美英核联盟的形成及影响”(skq201212);;
教育部重点研究基地项目“核武器与战后国际关系”(08JJDGJW265)
中文摘要
二战后英国一直奉行双轨核政策,即坚持发展本国独立核威慑力量与保持对美国的核依赖并举,但1960年英国取消"蓝光"导弹项目是英国双轨核政策陷入困境的临界点。英国双轨核政策面临本土核威慑力量的规模、独立核威慑力量的存在价值以及在野党和民众对核政策的质疑和对抗等问题。正是英国双轨核政策内在矛盾的激化与美英核"依存"关系的不对称与不对等导致英国核政策走向失衡。面对此,麦克米伦政府依然选择沿袭双轨核政策,其主要原因是:继续与美国进行核合作可以节省英国的核研发成本,密切美英特殊关系;继续保持一定程度的独立核威慑,可使英国避免成为美国的"卫星国",并有利于加强其与欧洲的关系,为欧洲防务作出自己的贡献。
参考文献
1 “闪电”导弹是美国空军部门研制的空中发射的弹道导弹,1959年开始研制,1962年肯尼迪政府因其精确性差、可靠性低、造价昂贵而予以取消。
2 可参阅Andrew J.Pierre,Nuclear Politics:The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force 1939-1970,London:Oxford University Press,1972;Stewart Menaul,Counterdown:Britains Strategic Nuclear Forces,London:Hale,1980;Ken Booth and John Baylis,Britain,NATO and Nuclear Weapons,London:Macmillan Press LTD,1989;Ian Clark,Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship:Britains Deterrent and America,1957-1962,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1994;S.J.Ball,The Bomber in British Strategy:Doctrine,Strategy,and Britains World Role,1945-1960,Boulder:Westview Press,1995;何其松:《英国核威慑之论争》,《欧洲研究》2008年第3期;夏立平:《论英国核政策——兼与法国核战略比较》,《国际观察》2009年第6期;王娟娟:《合作与纷争:艾森豪威尔时期美英核关系考察》,博士学位论文,南开大学历史系,2010年;杨华文:《英国核战略研究》,博士学位论文,华中师范大学历史系,2012年等。
3 国内有研究者认为1960年代的“空中闪电”导弹危机是战后英国核战略与美英核关系的转折点。可参阅杨华文:《“空中闪电”导弹危机与英国核战略的转向》,《历史教学》2011年第2期。
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1 Christopher Grayling and Christopher Langoon,Just Another Star?Anglo-American Relations Since 1945,London:Harrap,1988,pp.105-106;Clark,Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship,pp.46-47;Jan Mellissen,The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership:Britain,the United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance 1952-1959,Netherlands:STYX Publications,1993,pp.46-49.
2 Lawrence Freedman,“Britain:The First Ex-Nuclear Power?”International Security,Vol.6,No.2,Autumn 1981,pp.95-96.
3 “闪电”导弹危机是肯尼迪政府决定取消“闪电”导弹项目研制所引发的美英核关系危机。英国不得不再次与美国在拿骚谈判,会后美英达成协议,同意美国取消“闪电”导弹研制,作为补偿,美国允许英国购买“北极星”海基导弹。
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